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INTRODUCTION
Lincoln once asked, “[Is] it possible to lose the nation and
yet preserve the Constitution?” His rhetorical question
called for a negative answer no less than its corollary: “Is it
possible to lose the Constitution and yet preserve the
Nation?” Our Constitution and Nation are one. Neither
can exist without the other. It is with this thought in mind
that we should gauge the claims of those of those who
assert that national security requires what our Constitution
appears to condemn.1
These words are as applicable today as they were when first
uttered in 1962 by Former Chief Justice Earl Warren. In a postSeptember 11th world, the government is constantly using the
threat of terrorism to justify abrogating Americans’ civil liberties,
especially their First Amendment rights.2 In the military realm, the
government is also limiting soldiers’ civil liberties, namely their
First Amendment rights. Many active-duty soldiers post military
blogs (“milblogs”) from the front lines of the Iraq War, accessible
to anyone with an Internet connection. In an attempt to stem leaks
1
Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 200 (1962)
(citation omitted).
2
Paul Krugman, a columnist for the New York Times has noted that:
[T]he Bush administration and the movement it leads have been engaged in an
authoritarian project, an effort to remove all the checks and balances that have
heretofore constrained the executive branch. Much of this project involves the
assertion of unprecedented executive authority—the right to imprison people
indefinitely without charges (and torture them if the administration feels like
it), the right to wiretap American citizens without court authorization, the right
to declare, when signing laws passed by Congress, that the laws don’t really
mean what they say. But an almost equally important aspect of the project has
been the attempt to create a political environment in which nobody dares to
criticize the administration or reveal inconvenient facts about its actions.
Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, The Treason Card, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at A6.

DENBLEYKER_GALLEYPROOF_120706.DOC

404

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

1/23/2007 4:37 PM

Vol. 17:401

of what it sees as information helpful to the enemy, the Department
of Defense has promulgated a regulation requiring milbloggers to
register their websites with commanders, limiting what
milbloggers can post on their sites, and punishing authors who leak
sensitive information.3
Typically, courts recognize that First Amendment rights are
crucial to promoting public discourse in a democratic society.4 As
such, the Supreme Court typically gives speech a high degree of
protection, reviewing regulations limiting First Amendment rights
through a lens of strict scrutiny.5 However, the military is an
exception to this jurisprudence.6 In that context, the Court usually
defers to the military’s judgment on what degree of censorship is
necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the armed forces and
promote national security.7 However, the Court’s justification for
these differing degrees of review is unconvincing when applied to
milblogs. The question then becomes: Where should the balance
between national security and soldiers’ free speech rights lie?
This Note argues that the balance should lie where it does in
the civilian realm: through a lens of strict scrutiny. Part I
chronicles the rise and popularity of milblogs. Part I also addresses
the Department of Defense’s authority to promulgate milblogging
regulations, and introduces the Department of Defense’s
milblogging regulation. Part I also examines the military’s
enforcement of the Department of Defense’s regulation by
discussing three servicemen who have been punished for
milblogging. Part II compares how civilian courts treat the First
Amendment rights implicated by milblogs with military First
Amendment jurisprudence. Part III argues that milblogs serve
important societal interests and that courts’ traditional justification
for a different standard of First Amendment review in the military
does not apply to milblogs. Part III also argues that the
Department of Defense’s milblogging regulation is either (i) a de
3

See infra Part I.B.
See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991).
5
See, e.g., id.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
See infra Part II.B.
4
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facto prior restraint that should be viewed by courts as
presumptively unconstitutional; or, (ii) a regulation restricting
soldiers’ First Amendment rights that should be viewed by courts
through a lens of strict scrutiny because true national security
concerns will survive strict scrutiny while pretextual viewpoint
discrimination will not. This Note concludes by reiterating the
importance of the First Amendment and the need for stringent
judicial review of regulations designed to limit soldiers’ First
Amendment rights.
I. THE MILBLOGGING QUANDARY:
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S ATTEMPTS TO
REGULATE A NEW FORM OF COMMUNICATION
The ability of active-duty soldiers to post milblogs from the
front lines of the Iraq Conflict, accessible to anyone with an
Internet connection, has given the armed forces new operational
security problems.8 In an attempt to stem leaks of what it sees as
information helpful to the enemy, military leaders have
promulgated regulations censoring milblogs and punishing authors
who leak sensitive information.9 This section describes the
quandary milblogs pose to operational security by giving a brief
overview and description of milblogs, an explanation of the
Department of Defense’s attempts to regulate this new form of
communication, and an explanation of the Department of
Defense’s statutory authority to promulgate such restrictions on
communication.
A. The Rise of Milblogging
The term “milblog” is short for “military blogs,” which are
“online journals run by active duty military or reservists who have
returned to civilian life.”10 Milbloggers include “a core group of
about 100 regulars and hundreds more loosely organized activists,
angry contrarians . . . self-appointed pundits, and would-be
8

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
10
Hugh Hewitt, Rise of the Milblogs, DAILY STANDARD, Mar. 12, 2004,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/840fvgmo.asp.
9
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poets.”11 According to The Mudville Gazette,12 a website devoted
to information on military blogging administered by an Army
veteran who goes by the screen name Greyhawk, “only about a
dozen [milblogs] were in existence two years ago when the U.S.
invaded Iraq.”13 Today, as many as 200 active-duty soldiers keep
blogs,14 with a leading milblog search engine identifying “over
1,100 blogs from 24 [nations] by country, branch of service,
gender and popularity.”15 Milblogs are thus becoming an
increasingly-popular way for civilians to “‘listen in’ on the war
zone.”16
Although some milbloggers identify themselves on their
websites,17 other authors choose to remain anonymous, known
only by a pen name.18 Whether anonymous or not, “[s]oldier
bloggers encompass most ranks, jobs and locations.”19 These
soldiers are “writing from Iraqi Internet cafés, barracks and
anywhere else a soldier can log on to the Web.”20 Some of their
writings “feature practical news, photographs and advice.”21 Other
milblogs “are openly political,” some questioning the war and
11

John Hockenberry, The Blogs of War, WIRED, Aug. 2005, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.08/milblogs.html.
12
http://www.mudvillegazette.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
13
Jonathan Finer, The New Ernie Pyles: Sgtlizzie and 67cshdocs, WASH. POST,
Aug. 12, 2005, at A01. There are also many milblogs authored by soldiers not stationed
in Iraq. See Millblogging.com, http://www.milblogging.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
However, since the Department of Defense regulations discussed below deal only with
Iraq milblogs, non-Iraq milblogs and the regulations governing them are outside the
scope of this Note.
14
Finer, supra note 13.
15
Milblogging.com Joins Forces with Military.com; Leading Military Website Adds
World’s Largest Military Blog Portal to Accelerate Spread of Soldier-Journalism,
BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 18, 2006.
16
The Blogs of War, ARMY TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, available at
http:/www.armytimes.com/print.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-674310.php.
17
See http://www.milblogging.com for a list of anonymous and non-anonymous
milblogs.
18
See, e.g., THE MUDVILLE GAZETTE, http://www.mudvillegazette.com (last visited
Oct. 17, 2006) (identifying its author only as Greyhawk). Greyhawk is also credited with
“coining the term milblogger shortly after he started [The Mudville Gazette] in March
2003.” Hockenberry, supra note 11 (emphasis in original).
19
The Blogs of War, supra note 16.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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some cheering it.22 Some milbloggers view their sites as “a
rebellion against mainstream media, which, they say, leave out of
their newscasts and publications important stories about the war.”23
Many other milbloggers say they started their blogs to keep friends
and family members updated on what they are doing while
stationed overseas.24 Given this diversity of authorship and
purpose, the only common characteristics of milblogs are their
“casual, sometimes profane language”25 and their ability to “give
readers an unfiltered perspective on combat largely unavailable
elsewhere.”26
B. Balancing Operational Security with Civil Rights: The
Department of Defense’s Campaign to Restrict Milblogging
As blogging becomes more popular among soldiers, the
Department of Defense (“DOD”) has grown increasingly
concerned that soldiers may be inadvertently posting information
that could endanger troops embedded in war zones like Iraq. As
such, the DOD has enacted restrictions on the type of information
soldiers can and cannot post on the internet, as well as a

22

Id. For example, a blog written by National Guard Spec. Leonard Clark noted that
“[a] growing number of [soldiers in Iraq] are starting to wonder why we should continue
to risk our lives for this whole mess when we know that the government will probably
pull out of here.” Finer, supra note 13. Clark was fined $1,640 and demoted to private
first class in July of 2005 for “posting what the military said was classified material on
his blog.” Id.
23
The Blogs of War, supra note 16. For example, a blog written by Sgt. Elizabeth Le
Bel, known online as Sgtlizzie, described in harrowing detail her Humvee’s encounter
with a roadside bomb:
I started to scream bloody murder, and one of the other females on the convoy
came over, grabbed my hand and started to calm me down. She held on to me,
allowing me to place my leg on her shoulder as it was hanging free. . . . I
thought that my face had been blown off, so I made the remark that I wouldn’t
be pretty again. . . . Of course the medics all rushed with reassurance which
was quite amusing as I know what I look like now and I don’t even want to
think about what I looked like then.
Finer, supra note 13. However, “[t]he Army [only] released a three-sentence statement
about the incident in which her driver, a fellow soldier, was killed.” Id.
24
Finer, supra note 13.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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registration requirement for all milblogs operated by soldiers
stationed in Iraq.27
1. The Department of Defense’s Authority to Promulgate
Milblogging Regulations
The DOD’s authority to promulgate restrictions on milblogging
stems from Article I, sec. 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives
Congress “the power to raise and support armies; provide and
maintain a navy; and provide for organizing and disciplining
them.”28 The Constitution also makes the President Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, and, when called
to Federal service, Commander in Chief of various state militias.29
Based on “his powers as Commander in Chief, the President has
the power to promulgate Executive orders and service regulations
to govern the Armed Forces as long as they do not conflict with
any basic constitutional or statutory provisions.”30 Both “[t]he
President and Congress have authorized the Service secretaries and
military commanders to . . . promulgate [the] orders and
regulations” needed to maintain order and discipline in the armed
forces.31 Pursuant to this grant of power by the President
27
Memorandum from Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, MNC-I Policy #9 Unit and Soldier
Owned and Maintained Websites (Feb. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Vines Memorandum],
available at http://www.mediabistro.com/fishbowlDC/original/iraqblogrules.pdf.
28
Estela I. Velez Pollack, Military Courts-Martial: An Overview, Cong. Research
Service, May 26, 2004, www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21850. Using this authority, Congress
has enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–
941 (2006), to govern soldiers’ discipline and punishment. Id.
29
Rod Powers, Military Justice 101, About.com, http://usmilitary.about.com/od/
justicelawlegislation/a/miljustice_3.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
30
Id.
31
Id. “Our courts have consistently held that military regulations have the force and
effect of the law if they are consistent with the Constitution or statutes.” Id.; see also
infra Part II.B. “Regulations and orders issued at lower levels of command are
enforceable by Article 92 [of the] UCMJ, [10 U.S.C. § 892,] which prescribes violations
of general orders and regulations, and Articles 90, [10 U.S.C. § 890,] and 91, [10 U.S.C.
§ 891, of the] UCMJ, which prohibit disobedience of the commands of superiors.”
Powers, supra note 29. Military offenses are tried via either Special or General CourtsMartial, the trial level of the military court system. Pollack, supra note 28. Convictions
can then be appealed to a military Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. “If the conviction is
affirmed . . . the appellant may request review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces [CAAF], and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court.” Id. Review by the CAAF and
Supreme Court is discretionary and is usually how the constitutionality of military
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and Congress, the DOD issues directives to “establish or describe
policy, programs, and organizations; define missions; provide
authority; and assign responsibilities.”32
Specifically, DOD
Directives are “broad policy document[s] containing what is
required by legislation, the President, or the Secretary of Defense
to initiate, govern, or regulate actions or conduct by the DOD
Components within their specific areas of responsibilities.”33
DOD Directives thus govern all branches of the armed forces and
are given the force of law via the UCMJ and the Department of
Defense’s grant of power from the Legislative and Executive
branches of government.
2. The Department of Defense’s Blogging Regulations
In its power as armed forces regulator, the Department of
Defense has begun to crack down on what it sees as operational
security (“OpSec”) risks that have increased with the popularity of
milblogs. In an August 5, 2004 memorandum to all Army Leaders,
Army Chief of Staff Peter A. Schoomaker noted that “some
soldiers continue to post sensitive information to internet websites
and blogs, e.g., photos depicting system vulnerabilities and tactics,
techniques and procedures.”34 Schoomaker cautioned that “such
OpSec violations needlessly place lives at risk and degrade the
effectiveness of [the Army’s] operations.”35 Schoomaker further
warned that putting such information on the Internet is dangerous
because the enemy aggressively reads and exploits such

regulations is decided. Id.; see also infra Part II.B. So, unlike most other administrative
agencies, whose decisions are reviewed through the normal federal court system, military
law is reviewed by military-run courts until an appeal reaches the Supreme Court.
32
Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, What are the DoD
Issuances?, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/general.html (last visited Oct.
10, 2006).
33
Id.
34
Memorandum from Gen. Peter A. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, to Army
Leaders (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2005/08/usa0805.html
[hereinafter Schoomaker Memorandum]; see also Memorandum from Gen. Richard A.
Cody, Army Vice Chief of Staff, to Army Leaders (Feb. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2005/08/usa0805.html [hereinafter Cody Memorandum]
(noting that sensitive information, such as “annotated photos of an Abrams tank[’s
vulnerabilities] are easily found on the internet”).
35
Schoomaker Memorandum, supra note 34.
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information.36 Schoomaker’s memorandum also referred back to
an earlier memorandum from Gen. Richard A. Cody, Army Vice
Chief of Staff, admonishing army leaders to “protect information
that may have a negative impact on foreign relations with coalition
allies or world opinion.”37
Schoomaker’s memorandum was just a precursor to tighter
restrictions on milblogging. On April 6, 2005 Lieutenant General
John R. Vines issued Policy Memorandum #9, entitled “Unit and
Soldier Owned and Maintained Websites” to members of the
Multi-National Corps stationed in Iraq.38 This policy now requires
“all soldiers in Iraq [to] register their Web logs with their [unit]
commanders”39 by providing their unit, location, webmaster name,
telephone number and IP address of their blog or website.40 Unit
commanders, in turn, are required to monitor their subordinates’
websites “on a quarterly basis” to ensure that no prohibited
material has been posted.41 Prohibited material includes classified
information, the names of service members killed or wounded in
action before their families are notified, and accounts of incidents
still under investigation.42 Milbloggers also “must clear photos
While
through their unit public affairs representative.”43
individual posts need not be cleared ahead of time, it is an

36

See id.
Cody Memorandum, supra note 34.
38
Vines Memorandum, supra note 27.
39
Kelly Kennedy, Blog Brother: Army Eyes What Troops Post; Soldiers Cited for
Good, Bad Security Practices, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at 31; see also Finer,
supra note 13 (noting that this policy, promulgated by Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, the top
tactical commander in Iraq, was “the military’s first policy memorandum on Web sites
maintained by soldiers”).
40
Vines Memorandum, supra note 27. These regulations apply to both official military
websites (those with a .mil address or those sponsored by military command) and
unofficial ones (soldiers’ personal websites and blogs). Id. While individual posts do not
need to be cleared ahead of time, it is a soldier’s responsibility to ensure that what he is
posting to the Internet is permissible. Id.
41
Id.; see also The Blogs of War, supra note 16 (quoting Capt. Chris Karns, a
spokesman for U.S. Central Command, which oversees operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan).
42
Finer, supra note 13 (quoting Lt. Col. Steven Boylan, a military spokesman in
Baghdad who defends the regulations as “nearly identical to those required of news
organizations that cover the military”); see id.
43
Kennedy, supra note 39.
37
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individual soldier’s responsibility to ensure that his website
complies with these guidelines.44 Vines’ policy memorandum
notes generally that “risks of the release of information must be
weighed against the benefits of publishing to the Internet.”45 To
make soldiers’ assessments of this balance a bit easier, the Army
has created a website with examples of milblogs that meet these
regulations, and examples of those that do not.46 Finally, Vines’
memorandum notes that bloggers or website owners who publish
prohibited information will be instructed by the Army Web Risk
Assessment Cell (AWRAC) to close their website or link until the
offending information has been removed.47 Additionally, Vines’
memorandum warns that violators “may be subject to adverse
administrative action or punishment.”48
3. Enforcement: The Blogs of Private Leonard Clark, Army
Reservist Jason Hartley, and Major Michael Cohen
The Department of Defense’s new website regulations have
been enforced by “targeting bloggers with warnings, punctuated by
high-profile disciplinary action.”49 For example, Pfc. Leonard
Clark, an Arizona national guardsman serving in Iraq, was
demoted in rank and fined $1,640 in August, 2005, for putting
classified information on his blog.50 Another soldier, Army
National Guard Spec. Jason Hartley, was also demoted in rank and
fined $1,000.51 The Army claimed Hartley should not have posted
information about his unit’s flight route in Iraq, because it could
help the enemy shoot down U.S. aircraft, or information about his
rifle reloading pattern because it could help the enemy time an
attack.52 Major Michael Cohen, a doctor on duty at the Forward
Operating Base in Mosul, Iraq, was ordered to shut down his
44

Vines Memorandum, supra note 27.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. para. 6d.
48
Id. para. 6h.
49
Joseph Mallia, Soldiers’ Blogs U.S. Cracks Down: Tangled in the Web, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 2, 2006, at A04.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
45
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milblog after he reported in graphic detail on the casualties he
treated after the December 21, 2004, suicide bombing in Mosul
that killed 22 people.53
The cases of Clark, Hartley and Cohen illustrate the point that
“[n]owadays, milbloggers ‘get shut down almost as fast as they’re
set up[.]’”54 As the armed services struggle to adopt policies to
police milblogs, the question becomes in an unpopular war fighting
a nebulous enemy, how much power should the armed services
have to silence the voices of front-line soldiers, not all of whom
have a positive view of the war? While this issue has certainly
arisen before, most notably during the Vietnam War, the stakes are
even higher in the milblogging context because of the potential for
the Internet to amplify one soldier’s voice. In other words,
shutting down one milblog may mean depriving thousands of
civilians of a valuable source of information not only about the
war, but what it really means to fight for your country. However,
it is also extremely important to keep our soldiers safe by
prohibiting disclosure of information that could be used to harm
them.
This dilemma created by milblogs brings up obvious First
Amendment issues. It is thus useful to examine the First
Amendment both in a civilian context and as it is usually applied to
the armed forces.
II. LIMITS ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
CIVILIAN SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE COMPARED TO
MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations
implicate a number of core First Amendment issues, including
freedom of speech, prior restraints, and the public’s right to
know.55 It is thus useful to examine how these issues are dealt

53

Finer, supra note 13; see also The Blogs of War, supra note 16.
Mallia, supra note 49 (quoting New York Army National Guard Spc. Jason Hartley).
55
Ancillary First Amendment issues implicated by milblogs, including whether
bloggers are journalists and whether the Internet can be considered a public forum, are
beyond the scope of this Note.
54
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with in civilian courts, and compare the civilian treatment of the
First Amendment with its treatment in a military context.
A. Civilian First Amendment Jurisprudence
1. Freedom of Speech
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”56 Throughout history,
“the United States Supreme Court has consistently evidenced its
willingness to staunchly protect the right to free speech” in the
civilian realm.57 However, “although the First Amendment
appears to speak in absolutist terms” about the right to free speech,
the Court has never adopted a literal approach to dealing with First
Amendment issues.58 Instead, “[t]he Court has adopted a view that
seeks to strike a balance between individual rights and the good of
the community.”59 Courts “often take into account a variety of
factors, such as the content of the speech, the context in which it
was expressed, the type of restraint being employed, and the nature
of the harm that the restraint is intended to prevent or punish.”60 In
First Amendment cases, this balance “favors the side of speech, so
that the competing interest must be not merely weightier, but
weightier in some specified degree.”61 The result is that “a
restriction on speech may be unconstitutional, even though the
interest the restriction serves is legitimate and even perhaps
weightier than the competing speech interest[.]”62 The balancing
tests courts use to determine which is weightier, free speech
interests or the state’s regulatory interests, are known generally as
“levels of scrutiny.”63 Although courts give inconsistent labels to
56

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Rafic H. Barrage, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union: First Amendment Free
Speech Guarantee Extended to the Internet, 49 MERCER L. REV. 625, 627–28 (1998).
58
Id. at 628. But see Edmund Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”:
A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 554 (1962) (quoting Justice Black’s opinion
that the First Amendment “says ‘no law,’ and that is what I believe it means”).
59
Barrage, supra note 57, at 628.
60
MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 28 (7th ed. 2005).
61
Id. at 30–31.
62
Id. at 31.
63
Id.
57
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the methods they use to determine this balance, “three broad
‘levels of scrutiny’ have emerged”: strict, intermediate, and
rational basis scrutiny.64
Strict scrutiny requires the State to “show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.”65 In other words, the State must
articulate an interest “of compelling importance that it cannot
achieve” without the regulation.66 Strict scrutiny “is applied to
most ‘discriminatory restrictions or prohibitions on speech.’”67
Intermediate scrutiny is a step down from strict scrutiny and only
requires the State to show that the regulation is “closely related to
an ‘important,’ ‘significant,’ or ‘substantial’ government
interest.”68 Courts often use intermediate scrutiny to “evaluate
regulations that affect expression but are not targeted at expression,
target only ‘low-value’ expression, or do not discriminate among
types of expression.”69 Courts also use intermediate scrutiny to
evaluate “time, place and manner” regulations, holding that
“[r]egulations of the time, place and manner of expression are
constitutional if they . . . ‘are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.’”70 Rational basis scrutiny, the least
restrictive scrutiny applied by courts, requires that State
64

Id.
Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987); see also id.
66
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 598
(1983); see also FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 31.
67
FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 31; see also Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at
236 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68
FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 31.
69
Id. For example, the Court has noted that:
[w]hen speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, government regulation of that conduct is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968)) (internal quotations
omitted).
70
Id. at 32 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
44 (1983)).
65
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regulations bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose to be constitutional.71 “Rational basis
scrutiny is rarely applied when First Amendment interests are at
stake[;]” therefore, speech regulations are governed only by the
strict and intermediate levels of scrutiny.72
2. Prior Restraints
The concept of prior restraints on speech refers to
governmental restrictions on or censorship of speech before
Since the invention of the printing press,
publication.73
governments have tried to control its use.74 In England, the
government prohibited “printers from publishing works that had
not been licensed by government officials, who could censor
objectionable passages or deny a license altogether.”75 However,
“[e]ven before the First Amendment was adopted it was
understood in both England and America that ‘prior restraints’
were inconsistent with freedom of speech.”76 “[H]istorical
evidence suggests that the framers saw that a free press would be
essential to their vision of democracy and understood that it would
have to mean more than freedom from prior restraint.”77
Therefore, prior restraints are treated by courts as being
presumptively unconstitutional.78 In the Pentagon Papers case,
New York Times Co. v. United States,79 the government attempted
to overcome this presumption by showing that a Department of
Justice injunction against publication of the papers at issue was
justified because publication would endanger national security. In
a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court noted that the
71

Id.
Id.
73
Id. at 96–97 (noting the difficulty of defining “prior restraint” with any degree of
precision).
74
Id. at 89.
75
Id. This licensing requirement “was codified by Parliament in a series of acts
making it a criminal offense to print a work without a license[.]” Id.
76
Id. at 89–90 (quoting William Blackstone’s opinion that “[t]he liberty of the press is
indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous
restraints on publications”).
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
79
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
72
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government had not met its “heavy burden of showing justification
for the imposition of such a restraint.”80
In contrast, one of the few cases upholding a prior restraint on
the press in the interest of national security, United States v.
Progressive, Inc.,81 involved an injunction under the Atomic
Energy Act82 prohibiting The Progressive magazine from
publishing an article entitled “The H Bomb Secret: How We Got
It, Why We’re Telling It.”83 The magazine contended that its
article was merely a compendium of information already in the
public domain.84 The government argued that much of the
information was not in the public domain and that even if the
information was publicly available, publication of the compendium
in an easily-accessible format could “help enemies who otherwise
would not put all the pieces together.”85 The court held that
“publication of the technical information on the hydrogen bomb
contained in the article is analogous to publication of troop
movements or locations in time of war and falls within the
extremely narrow exception to the rule against prior restraint.”86
Although Progressive “is a product of the Cold War era, it is easy
to transpose its security concerns” to the current post-September
11th climate.87
3. The Public’s Right to Know
The public’s right to be informed about government activities
was part of the founding rhetoric of the United States.88 James
80

Id. at 714 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
82
42 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et. seq. (2003).
83
Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990.
84
Id.
85
FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 101.
86
Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 996.
87
FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 102 (noting that “it is easy to imagine terrorists
using information about weaknesses in our critical infrastructure . . . or information about
chemical or biological weapons materials to harm . . . Americans” and further noting that
governmental officials “essentially ‘classified’ the Ph.D dissertation of a George Mason
University graduate student for security reasons”).
88
See Malla Pollack, Article, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at
the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First
Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 67 (1999) (citing Letter from James
81

DENBLEYKER_GALLEYPROOF_120706.DOC

2007

FIRST AMENDMENT AND MILBLOGGING

1/23/2007 4:37 PM

417

Madison noted that “knowledge will forever govern ignorance”
and “[a] popular government without popular information []or the
means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or
perhaps both.”89 Today, “[t]he public’s right to know is the
philosophical basis of many statutes that force government entities
to provide documents on request or to allow the public into
meetings.”90 However, there is no specific “right to know”
enumerated in the United States Constitution.91 Some First
Amendment theorists argue that the right to know can be created
out of the First Amendment rights “to hear the views of others and
to listen to their version of the facts,” “the right to inquire,” and “to
a degree, the right of access to information.”92 However, others
“‘read the Press Clause of the First Amendment to assure merely
the existence of the free press as an institution[.]’”93 Justice Potter
Stewart has noted that “[t]he press is free to do battle against
secrecy and deception in government[,] [b]ut the press cannot
expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed . . .
[t]he Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act
nor an Official Secrets Act.”94 Moreover, “[s]ome scholars find
the concept of a ‘right to know’ absurd because it implies that
government has a positive duty to keep the public informed[,]”
even though “[n]egative rights, . . . like the public’s possible right
not to have the government block access to information, are
common in the Constitution.”95
One notable case where the public’s right to know was invoked
regarding military operations is Flynt v. Rumsfeld.96 In Flynt, the
Madison to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), in James Madison, The Complete Madison 337
(Saul K. Padover ed., 1953)).
89
Id. at 67.
90
Id. at 70 (citing the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552–59, as an example).
However, it is recognized that “[g]iving citizens unfettered access to government
documents and processes . . . threatens other important values, such as privacy, national
security, and administrative efficiency.” FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 603.
91
See Pollack, supra note 88, at 73.
92
Id. at 70–71, n.116 (quoting Thomas I. Emerson and noting several cases in which he
made similar statements).
93
Id. at 73.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 73–74.
96
355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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publisher of Hustler magazine sought permission to accompany
ground troops on combat missions in Afghanistan.97 Although
journalists had access to the fighting in Afghanistan via a pool
system,98 Flynt sought the “right to travel with military units into
combat, with all of the accommodations and protections that
entails[.]”99 In support of this request, Flynt argued that “the
military is obligated to accommodate the press because the press is
what informs the electorate as to what our government is doing at
war.”100 However, the court felt differently, holding that “there is
no constitutionally based right for the media to embed with U.S.
military forces in combat[.]”101 Flynt is thus an example of the
skepticism with which courts regard arguments involving the
public’s right to know. Although the public may have a right to be
informed about military operations, this right was not enough to
trump the military’s right to control access by the press.102
B. The Military’s Unique First Amendment Jurisprudence
Courts treat First Amendment claims with a higher degree of
skepticism in the military context than the civilian context. From
the beginning of American history, military servicemembers have
had limited First Amendment rights.103 “Persuasive scholarship
has indicated that the founding fathers envisioned a limited, if not
non-existent, role for the First Amendment in the armed
services.”104 These limited rights were a logical extension of
America’s early sedition laws, since “drafters who supported
doctrines of seditious libel in the civilian sphere [did not want to
97

See id. at 699.
The pool system of military journalism was created in conjunction with the Persian
Gulf War. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 643. Under this system, “media
organizations chosen by the [Defense] Department were allowed to select specific
reporters to be transported to cover the early stages of military operations.” Id. “These
reporters would then ‘pool’ their information, sharing it with other reporters who had not
been selected.” Id.
99
Flynt, 355 F.3d at 702 (emphasis in original).
100
Id. (emphasis and internal quotations omitted).
101
Id. at 706.
102
See id.
103
See Donald N. Zillman, Free Speech and Military Command, 1977 UTAH L. REV.
423, 429 (1977).
104
Id.
98
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protect similarly] disruptive speech by men in uniform.”105 The
view that the First Amendment was inapplicable to the military
prevailed throughout the eighteen- and nineteen-hundreds.106 As
such, “[s]erious consideration of military First Amendment rights
did not begin until the post-World War II era.”107 By this time, the
armed forces had evolved into a “vastly different [organization]
from that of the 1790s or 1880s[.]”108 Increasingly sophisticated
warfare had led to a broadening of soldiers’ duties, thus requiring
an “increase in the level and diversity of education among men and
women in uniform.”109 Additionally, “[t]he subtleties of the Cold
War, nuclear weapons, and the emergence of third world
powers . . . ended easy distinctions between military and political
matters.”110 The burgeoning military-industrial complex thus
served to convince constitutional scholars that First Amendment
rights were a “relevant concern in the military[.]”111
Although scholars first recognized the importance of the First
Amendment to the military in the 1950s, unsurprisingly, most of
the military’s modern First Amendment jurisprudence was shaped
during the Vietnam War era.112 Because the Vietnam War was
unpopular among both civilians and many judges, “by 1974 federal
courts had developed a willingness to review a variety of military
actions on both procedural and substantive grounds.”113 First
Amendment cases arising during this era demonstrate that “courts
recognized that the military could not deny substantive
constitutional rights ipse dixit, solely because the military is the
105

Id.
See id. at 429–430.
107
Id.; see also Edward F. Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen’s First
Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 330 (1971) (noting that “although substantial
numbers of servicemen were court-martialed for speech which was critical of the
President during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, First
Amendment issues were rarely raised and never found to constitute a bar to prosecution
or conviction”).
108
Zillman, supra note 103, at 430.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See generally Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Constitutional Rights
and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 396
(1976).
113
Id. at 401.
106
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military.”114 However, as one of these cases, United States v.
Priest,115 demonstrates, the courts’ review of First Amendment
issues was highly deferential to the military’s authority to
promulgate rules promoting order and discipline.
While
servicemembers had First Amendment rights, their rights were
subject to many more restrictions than those of civilians.116 This
deferential review of policies restricting servicemen’s First
Amendment rights was adopted by the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Glines,117 and continues to this day.
It is thus useful to examine both Priest and Glines to determine
what standard of review the Court would be likely to employ
should it have occasion to rule on the constitutionality of the
military’s current restrictions on blogging.
1. United States v. Priest
United States v. Priest involved charges against a serviceman
who, while on active duty in the Navy, edited, published and
distributed an on-base underground newspaper entitled “OM.”118
The purpose of OM was to protest the United States’ involvement
in Vietnam and, more generally, to speak out against the military
establishment.119 As such, issues of OM contained antiwar poems,
quotations attributed to well-known antiwar advocates, and explicit
instructions on how servicemen could desert the armed forces by
going to Canada.120 One issue also contained a quasi-violent
antiwar sentiment, suggesting “the velocity with which the Vice
President would strike the pavement if he was pushed or fell from
the Empire State Building.”121 The Priest court noted that these
words established the accused’s “abandonment of change by
constitutional means and adoption of violence as the method by
which his viewpoint is to be imposed on the United States.”122
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
21 C.M.A. 564 (1972).
See, e.g., id. at 570.
444 U.S. 348 (1980).
Priest, 21 C.M.A. at 566.
Id.
See id. at 566–67.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 568–69.
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Ultimately, the court upheld Priest’s punishment.123 In doing
so, the court recognized its duty to strike a “proper balance . . .
between the essential needs of the armed services and the right to
speak out as a free American.”124 The court emphasized that while
“First Amendment rights of civilians and members of the armed
forces are not necessarily coextensive . . . our national reluctance
to inhibit free expression dictates that the connection between the
statements or publications involved and their effect on military
discipline be closely examined.”125 Despite these words, the court
concluded that Priest’s newspaper was improperly questioning
authority because the role of a soldier is “to execute orders, not to
debate the wisdom of decisions that the Constitution entrusts to the
legislative and judicial branches of the Government and to the
Commander-in-Chief.”126
The Priest court also noted that “[i]n the armed forces some
restrictions exist for reasons that have no counterpart in the civilian
community.”127 For example, disrespectful or contemptuous
speech that may be tolerated in the civilian context is often
constitutionally unprotected in the military community because it
“may . . . undermine the effectiveness of response to command.”128
The Priest court concluded that the military was well within its
authority to punish a single serviceman for publishing his criticism
of the armed forces because such words could lead to larger dissent
within the troops.129 This rationale also underpins the Court’s
decision in Brown v. Glines.130
2. Brown v. Glines
Decided eight years after Priest, Brown v. Glines involved
challenges to a United States Air Force (U.S.A.F.) regulation
“requir[ing] members of the service to obtain approval from their

123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id. at 573.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 570.
Id.
See id. at 569–71.
444 U.S. 348 (1980).
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commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases.”131
Captain Glines, while on active duty at Travis Air Force Base in
California, “drafted petitions to several Members of Congress and
to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air Force’s
grooming standards.”132
Because Glines knew he needed
command approval to solicit signatures within the base, he first
circulated the petitions off-base.133 However, during a training
flight at Anderson Air Force Base in Guam, Glines violated the
U.S.A.F. regulation by giving “the petitions to an Air Force
sergeant without seeking approval from the base commander.”134
A majority of the Supreme Court voted to uphold the U.S.A.F.
regulation under which Glines was punished.135
a) The Glines majority
As in Priest, the Glines majority concluded that “while
members of the military services are entitled to the protections of
the First Amendment, ‘the different character of the military
community and of the military mission requires a different
application of those protections.’”136 Servicemembers’ rights
must, therefore, “yield somewhat to meet certain overriding
demands of discipline and duty” to ensure that “[m]ilitary
personnel [are] ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion
arises.”137 The Glines majority thus recognized that “[l]oyalty,
morale and discipline are essential attributes of all military
service.”138 “Combat service obviously requires [these attributes,]
[a]nd members of the Armed Services, wherever they are assigned,
may be transferred to combat duty or called to deal with civil
The Glines majority thus
disorder or natural disaster.”139
concluded that because the U.S.A.F. petition regulation was a prior
approval requirement that supported commanders’ authority to
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 349.
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 354 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974)).
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974)).
Id. at 356 n.14.
Id.
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maintain basic discipline on base, it “did not offend the First
Amendment.”140
b) Justice Brennan’s Dissent
Although the Glines majority felt that high deference was due
the military in this context, Justice Brennan’s dissent argued that
the majority was upholding a U.S.A.F. regulation that had
established “an essentially discretionary regime of censorship that
arbitrarily deprives [servicemembers] of precious communicative
rights.”141 Justice Brennan noted that the circulation of petitions
“is indisputably protected First Amendment activity” that
implicates a number of related rights: “the right to express
ideas, . . . the right to be exposed to ideas expressed by others, . . .
the right to communicate with government, . . . and the right to
associate with others in the expression of opinion.”142 The
U.S.A.F. regulation, in Justice Brennan’s view, was an improper
prior restraint on these rights because such restraints could only be
exercised to “avert[] a virtually certain prospect of imminent,
severe injury to the Nation in time of war.”143
Furthermore, Justice Brennan felt that the command-approval
procedure for petition circulation was “seriously flawed.”144
Justice Brennan emphasized that “restraints upon communication
must be hedged about by procedures that guarantee against
infringement of protected expression and that eliminate the play of
discretion that epitomizes arbitrary censorship.”145 However, no
such safeguards were in place for those denied the opportunity to
petition under the U.S.A.F. regulation at issue in Glines.146 There
was also some evidence of viewpoint discrimination in Glines
since two of the respondents individually submitted a single leaflet
for approval by their base commander, who denied one of the two

140

Id.
Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142
Id. at 362–63 (internal citations omitted).
143
Id. at 364. The activity at issue in Brown occurred during the late 1970s, which was
not a time of war for the United States.
144
Id. at 366.
145
Id.
146
See id.
141
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“disrespectful

and

Justice Brennan further noted that the U.S.A.F. regulation was
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.148
Assuming the majority correctly concluded that maintenance of
military order and discipline were compelling government
interests, Justice Brennan noted that “if the danger of incitement
necessitates prior clearance of servicemen’s messages, it would be
logical for the military to mandate preclearance of all
messages. . . .”149 Also, “[t]he only rational basis for disparate
treatment of petitioning and oral communication would be the
presence of some danger peculiar to the process of petitioning.”150
Since no such danger existed, Justice Brennan concluded that the
U.S.A.F. regulation should be found to violate servicemembers’
First Amendment rights.151
3. Modern First Amendment Jurisprudence is Less Deferential
in the Civilian Realm than in the Military
Despite Justice Brennan’s pointed dissent, modern First
Amendment military jurisprudence closely tracks the high level of
deference given by the Glines majority.152 Modern civilian First
Amendment cases are characterized by the “demand for contentneutrality absent overriding justification, the presumption against
prior restraints, and the requirement of enhanced clarity and
specificity. . . .”153 In contrast, modern military First Amendment
cases are characterized by such a high level of deference to
military “judgments of necessity, efficiency, and appropriateness
of means” that some commentators “question whether judicial
review is even applicable.”154 More specifically,

147

Id. at 367 n.10.
See id. at 367.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 368 (emphasis in original).
151
See id.
152
See C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment is not Preferred: The Military
and Other “Special Contexts,” 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779 (1988).
153
Id. at 798–99.
154
Id. at 799.
148
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there are . . . three major themes reflected in the deferential
judicial posture adopted in the military cases. First, there is
an effort to denigrate competing [F]irst [A]mendment
concerns. Second, the courts invoke justiciability concerns,
emphasizing the dominant constitutional roles of Congress
and the Executive in controlling the military and the lack of
judicial capabilities. Third . . . the courts stress the unique
and special needs of the military . . .
as a separate community.155 Courts defer to the armed forces in
First Amendment cases and give the military’s policies a high
presumption of constitutionality.156 As discussed below, this
deferential standard of review is inappropriate in the milblogging
context, where strict scrutiny should be used to preserve the
important interests milblogs serve and protect against viewpoint
discrimination.
III. PRESERVATION OF THE NATION VERSUS
PRESERVATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE BALANCE
BETWEEN DEFERENCE TO MILITARY JUDGMENT AND
PROTECTION OF SOLDIERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS SHOULD LIE
Milblogging serves many important interests, including giving
soldiers an outlet for their combat-related tension, serving as a
check on unbridled military power, and informing Americans
about events in Iraq not covered by the mainstream media. To
preserve these interests while ensuring the safety of our nation,
courts should review the Department of Defense’s milblogging
regulations using strict scrutiny. Utilization of this test by courts
will allow for legitimate national security concerns to pass
constitutional muster while preventing cloaked viewpoint
discrimination.

155
156

Id. at 815; see also supra notes 102–105, 114–117 and accompanying text.
See Dienes, supra note 152, at 815.

DENBLEYKER_GALLEYPROOF_120706.DOC

426

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

1/23/2007 4:37 PM

Vol. 17:401

A. Milblogging Serves Important Interests
Unlike low-value speech, such as obscenity,157 milbloggers’
speech serves important societal interests. Milblogs serve as
therapeutic devices for many soldiers, allowing them to express
themselves freely and relieve the tensions of war, while also
informing milblog readers about events in Iraq not covered by the
mainstream media.158 In this way, milblogs also serve as a check
on unbridled military power.159 Milblogs thus contain valuable
speech that is deserving of strict scrutiny review by the courts.
1. Milblogs Allow Soldiers to Relieve Their Tension
Milblogs are an important therapeutic tool for soldiers because
they allow soldiers to freely vent their frustrations within a highly
bureaucratic organization.160 This may actually help to maintain
order and discipline, allowing the military to act more
cohesively.161 Although this premise may seem counterintuitive,
given the American tendency towards free speech, it is “dangerous
to prevent accumulated military discontent from being discharged
through” milblogging.162 Moreover, “[i]f there is a lesson from
Vietnam for military attorneys and commanders, it would be that
mindless censorship often is the policy most disruptive of military
discipline and morale.”163 Silencing dissent, then, is often more
disruptive than allowing it, and will allow soldiers to express their
frustrations in ways relatively harmless to the military. Having
vented their tensions, these soldiers can then coalesce as an
effective fighting unit.
157

See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (holding that theaters
could be enjoined from showing obscene films).
158
Cf. Detlev F. Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 190
(1957) (noting that “it seems dangerous to prevent accumulated military discontent from
being discharged through the virtually harmless channels of griping to friends or writing
letters to the editors of service or civilian papers or to families at home”).
159
Id. at 190.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 410; see also Zillman, supra note 103, at
433 (noting that “free speech can provide better officers and enlisted men [while]
suppression of speech can foster low morale and narrow thinking”).
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In addition to being a way for soldiers to vent their frustrations,
free speech also allows soldiers to achieve individual selffulfillment.164 Freedom of speech is “one of the individual’s most
precious rights, a fundamental liberty rooted in our ethics, politics,
and religion [that] . . . stands as an end it itself, deserving our
defense against every encroachment not required by some
competing interest critical to our survival.”165 Although national
security interests may dictate some encroachment on service
members’ right to free speech, “[a] person who enters the armed
services remains an individual, a possessor of rights as well as a
subject of duties, and his sacrifices of basic liberties should [thus]
be kept to a minimum.”166 Strict scrutiny would allow censorship
of information vital to national security interests while ensuring
that millions of servicemen are not reduced to second-class citizens
with fewer First Amendment rights than the civilian population.167
2. Milblogs Inform Citizens and Serve as a Check on Military
Power
While there is some skepticism about whether there is a
constitutional “right to know,”168 theorists and courts, alike,
recognize that the First Amendment protections given to free
speech and press serve as important checks on unbridled
government power and inform the public about important issues.169
Milblogs also accomplish these tasks and their soldier-authors’
words should thus be given the highest degree of First Amendment
protection.
Freedom of speech in the military context, like in the civilian
realm, acts as a check on the unmitigated power of government.170
Criticism of government in the civilian context is valued “for its

164

Zillman, supra note 103 (noting that “in the often confining circumstances of the
military, freedom of expression is a reminder of individual uniqueness and worth”).
165
Vagts, supra note 158, at 190.
166
Id.; see also Zillman, supra note 103, at 433 (noting that “[f]reedom of expression
can promote . . . ‘individual self-fulfillment’”).
167
Vagts, supra note 158, at 190.
168
See infra Part II.B.3.
169
See supra notes 69–70, 76–77, 89–90 and accompanying text.
170
See Zillman, supra note 103, at 431–433.
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role in discouraging overreaching, arrogance and remoteness.”171
Likewise, in the military context, “[u]nrestricted speech reveals
information and encourages wise policies.”172 Free speech
“provides necessary insight into the policymakers as well as the
policy itself.”173 Suppression of free speech in the military would
seal its members off from “potentially critical or unfavorable
speech.”174 A military “isolated from political debate and the
winds of change can become a repressive force, out of touch with
the values and ideals of the civilian society.”175 A military that
suppresses free speech could thus constitute “a serious danger to
the American democratic and constitutional system.”176 By
blogging about their experiences in Iraq, soldiers are merely
holding the military’s Iraqi policies up to the light, allowing
citizens to judge their wisdom. Although milbloggers may not
always portray the armed forces in a favorable light, it is crucial
for Americans to receive more than a whitewashed view of the Iraq
War. Moreover, insights citizens gain from milblogs can help fuel
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”177 public debate about Iraq,
which is essential to democracy.
Beyond participation in the democratic system, Americans also
should be informed about military policy because of its impact on
every citizen’s safety. The value of speech increases “with the
significance of the issue discussed.”178 Therefore, “[t]he relevance
of defense issues to each citizen’s physical security should
encourage a substantial release of information.”179 Moreover,
“[t]he value of speech also increases with the knowledge of the
speaker.”180 As stated throughout this Note, milblogs written by
soldiers fighting in the front lines of the Iraq War provide
Americans thousands of miles away with invaluable insights into
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id. at 431.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
Sherman, supra note 107, at 367 (1971).
Id.
Id.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
Zillman, supra note 103, at 432.
Id.
Id.
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the war.181 Milbloggers may portray the Iraq War differently than
the mainstream media,182 but this divergence makes their writings
even more valuable.183 Moreover, “[t]he military penchant for
internal secrecy and its often remote overseas locations”184 make
writings from front-line soldiers “even more valuable” to the
public discourse.185
Milbloggers’ impressions of the war,
anecdotes about their experiences in Iraq, and vivid portrayals of
events only glossed over by the mainstream media thus all provide
crucial information to both fuel the public discourse about the Iraq
war and inform the citizenry about issues relevant to national
security.
B. Courts Should Evaluate the Department of Defense’s
Milblogging Regulations Using Strict Scrutiny
Despite the important interests discussed above,186 under
current military jurisprudence, a court would scrutinize the
Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations with more
deference given to the military than is common under strict
scrutiny.187 However, courts’ previous justification for applying a
lesser degree of scrutiny to military laws restricting
servicemembers’ First Amendment rights are unconvincing in the
milblogging context.188 Moreover, the nature of the DOD’s
milblogging regulations dictates that a court should either view
them either as presumptively unconstitutional or through a lens of
strict scrutiny.
1. Milbloggers Are Not a Separate Community
Courts generally defer to military judgment on speech issues
because they view the military as a separate community, distinct
181

See supra Part I.A.
See supra note 23.
183
Cf. Zillman, supra note 103, at 432 (noting that while citizens “may not believe the
dissenting expert, the fact that discussion exists may change [the] perspective on the
matter in controversy”).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
See supra Part III.
187
See supra Part II.B.
188
See infra Part III.B.3.
182
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from the civilian world.189 The Glines majority’s conclusion that
the “different character” of the military justifies lower First
Amendment protections is an example of this type of thinking.190
There are five characteristics of the military that set it apart from
the civilian realm:
First, the primary purpose of the military, fighting wars, is
hard and dangerous. Thousands of years of military history
have not changed this basic fact. Second, the work of the
military, defending national interests or even the nation
itself, is a vital national activity. Third, despite rhetoric
over the glory of the military, the great bulk of soldiers
suffering casualties are from the lower social classes,
generally poorly paid, and often lightly rewarded in
prestige. Fourth, the military is by nature an emergency
force. National affairs are in their most satisfactory state
when the nation is at peace—when the military is not
performing its distinctive function. In peacetime, problems
arise in maintaining employee preparedness and
motivation. Fifth, in many cases, the objective of battle or
war is only dimly perceived or even actively opposed by
the combat troops. Sophisticated political, geographic, and
economic theories are lost on the soldier concerned with
personal survival.191
Moreover, “the military fulfills a unique purpose and
mission.”192 We entrust the military with “a vast array of weapons
systems and technologies, capable of destroying not only towns
and countries, but human civilization as we know it.”193 Courts
thus hold that the military’s “awesome responsibilit[ies]”

189

See Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 397.
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
758 (1974)); see also Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 397 (noting that
“[m]ilitary proponents . . . argue[] that the special nature of the Armed Forces as an
organization devoted to national defense justifie[s] legal standards different from those
normally applied to constitutional rights”).
191
See Zillman & Imwindelreid, supra note 112, at 402.
192
John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community Striking a Balance Between
Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F.L. REV. 303, 345 (1998).
193
Id.
190
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distinguish it from other civilian organizations where speech is
protected more stringently.194
However, the modern military is not really a separate
community that justifies judicial deference to military selfgovernment.195
The “society apart” was a valid description of the small,
19th century, regular Army fighting Indians on the frontier.
The description was still largely valid when forces stood
garrison or shipboard duty in the 1930s. But by 1974 the
military had become a multimillion-person employer
involved in almost every aspect of American life.196
In addition to growing larger in size, the modern military has
changed its recruitment tactics to emphasize the development of
skills that can be carried over into the civilian realm.197 The
modern military has become increasingly specialized and
technology-based, meaning that “many servicemen pursue careers
little different from and no more strenuous or dangerous than
numerous civilian pursuits.”198 Data technicians, statisticians, JAG
lawyers and army doctors are all examples of the increasinglycommon non-combat soldier. The line between civilian and
solider has blurred in the modern military, to the extent that a
separate standard of review for military policies that abridge First
Amendment rights is no longer justified.
Milblogs, in particular, illustrate this blurring of the civilian
and military realms. In the Internet Age, it can hardly be argued
that milbloggers are a separate community, set apart from their
civilian readers. On the contrary, milbloggers are part of a Web
community consisting of both civilians and servicemen, and it is
this interconnectedness that has military officials worried. The
Army claims operational security is at risk not because milblogs
are seen only by servicemen, but because “anyone with access to
the Internet can read many first-hand accounts of life in a war zone
194
195
196
197
198

Id.
See Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 400.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403.
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within seconds after they’re finished.”199 Milblogs are narrowing
the “increasing distance between the civilian and military worlds,
and the divergence in values of both.”200 Instead of being part of a
separate community, then, milblogs are merging two communities
together. To be sure, the military still has unique security and
disciplinary needs that set it apart from many other organizations.
However, the experience of “para-military forces, such as police
and fire departments,” indicates that servicemembers can be given
First Amendment rights while still performing their duties with a
high degree of loyalty and discipline.201 The Supreme Court’s
traditional deference to military censorship authority based on the
separateness of the armed forces is thus inapplicable in the
milblogging context.
2. The Department of Defense’s Milblogging Regulations are
a De Facto Prior Restraint and Should Thus Be
Presumptively Unconstitutional
Because of their potential chilling effect on soldiers’ speech,
the Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations are a de facto
prior restraint and should thus be viewed as presumptively
unconstitutional. De facto prior restraints are notoriously hard to
define,202 but are essentially regulations that have the same
censoring effect as an injunction or a licensing scheme.203 De
facto prior restraints are distinct from regulations mandating a
subsequent punishment for unlawful activity.204 However, “in
some instances the operation and effect of a particular enforcement
scheme, though not in the form of a traditional prior restraint,
may . . . raise the same concerns which inform all of [the Supreme
199

Mark Memmott, ‘Milbloggers’ Are Typing Their Place in History, USA TODAY,
May 12, 2005, available at http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2005/05/12/
milbloggers_are_typing_their_place_in_history.html.
200
Hugh Hewitt, supra note 10.
201
Sherman, supra note 107, at 367 (1971).
202
See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 96–97 (discussing the ambiguity between de
facto prior restraints and subsequent punishment).
203
Id. at 96.
204
See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1993) (holding that the
plaintiff’s forfeiture of obscene materials under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) was a subsequent punishment, not a prior restraint on his First
Amendment rights).
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Court’s] prior restraint cases: the evils of state censorship and the
unacceptable chilling of protected speech.”205
The Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations contain
several elements that will potentially chill speech.
The
requirement that milbloggers and website hosts register their blogs
with unit commanders206 has the chilling effect of removing the
Internet’s anonymity. Milbloggers now know that their unit,
location, webmaster name, telephone number and IP address of
their blog or website are all on file with their commanders.207
Moreover, milbloggers know that these commanders will be
reading and monitoring their blogs for possible operational security
breaches.208
Their lack of anonymity combined with the
knowledge that their commanders may be reading every post will
surely cause most milbloggers to think twice about posting things
critical of the war or of their units. Moreover, the knowledge that
under this policy other soldiers have been punished for blogs
critical of the Iraq War209 might cause many milbloggers to change
the tone of their writing to advocate a more pro-Iraq view. As one
commentator has noted, “[t]he necessity of submitting to
censorship will of itself deter many prospective authors from
publishing their views,”210 especially given the fact that “[c]ensors
are apt to be hyper-cautious, particularly at lower military
echelons.”211 Moreover, “[t]he delays occurring ‘while the censor
ponders moodily on “policy and propriety”‘ may serve to nullify
the impact of a communication because the public’s interest in
military matters is particularly evanescent.”212 The appeal of
milblogs is largely based on the ability to read real-time accounts
of the fighting in Iraq, so without up-to-date postings, the
uniqueness of the genre is lost. While the enforcement of the
205

Id. at 572 (Kennedy, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
Kennedy, supra note 39, at 31; see also Finer, supra note 13 (noting that this policy,
promulgated by Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, the top tactical commander in Iraq, was “the
military’s first policy memorandum on Web sites maintained by soldiers”).
207
Vines’ Memorandum, supra note 27.
208
Id.
209
See infra Part IV.B.3.b.
210
Vagts, supra note 158, at 213.
211
Id.
212
Id.
206
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Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations could be
characterized as a subsequent punishment, the burdens posed by
these regulations are a de facto prior restraint because they
unacceptably chill protected speech. The registration requirement
and loss of anonymity make it more than likely that potential
milbloggers will conclude that posting their experiences in an
online diary is simply not worth the hassle and risk. Countless
viewpoints of the Iraq War will thus be lost, as will civilians’
ability to vicariously experience the Iraq war via milblogs.
3. Courts Should Apply Strict Scrutiny to the Department of
Defense’s Milblogging Regulations
Even if the Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations
are not an unconstitutional prior restraint, courts still should not
defer to military censorship authority. Instead, courts should
utilize strict scrutiny to ensure that servicemembers’ First
Amendment rights are being protected to the greatest extent
possible. While it is true that “[a] sad paradox requires that the
serviceman sacrifice some of the liberties which he is called upon
to protect,”213 it is the job of the courts to police the Constitution.
“[I]f judicial review is to constitute a meaningful restraint upon
unwarranted encroachments upon freedom in the name of military
necessity, situations in which the judiciary refrains from examining
the merit of the claim of necessity must be kept to an absolute
minimum.”214 One only need look at Korematsu v. United
States215 to be reminded that high deference to military judgment
in the interest of national security can allow atrocities to take place.
Certainly, “[m]ilitary (or national) security is a weighty
interest . . . .”216 However, “the concept of military necessity is
seductively broad, and has a dangerous plasticity”217 that can be
invoked to “justify an encroachment upon civil liberties.”218
213

Id. at 189.
Warren, supra note 1, at 193.
215
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (deferring to the military’s judgment that it was necessary, for
national security reasons, to exclude thousands of Japanese-American citizens from
certain areas of the West Coast following the Pearl Harbor bombing).
216
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 369 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217
Id.
218
Id.
214
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Therefore, “the military-security argument must be approached
with a healthy skepticism: its very gravity counsels that courts be
cautious when military necessity is invoked by the Government to
justify a trespass on First Amendment rights.”219 True national
security concerns will survive strict scrutiny, as discussed below,
while cloaked viewpoint discrimination will not. In this way, strict
scrutiny will ensure that milbloggers’ First Amendment rights are
being stringently protected while still allowing the military to
guard against the release of information dangerous to operational
security.
a) The Lessons of the Pentagon Papers and The
Progressive: True National Security Concerns Will
Withstand Strict Scrutiny
True national security concerns will survive a strict scrutiny
review of the Department of Defense regulation abridging
milbloggers’ First Amendment rights. While the Supreme Court
ultimately ruled in favor of publication in New York Times Co. v.
United States,220 it did so by noting that the government had not
met its heavy burden of showing a valid national security concern
that would justify enjoining publication of the Pentagon Papers.221
The government had not shown that publication of the Pentagon
Papers would obstruct military recruiting, disclose the sailing dates
of military transports, or disclose the number and location of
troops.222 The New York Times Court thus implied that a valid
national security concern would overcome the presumption against
prior restraints.223 It follows, then, that valid national security
concerns would also be enough to survive the slightly less rigorous
strict scrutiny analysis.

219

Id.
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
221
Id. at 714 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) and
noting that there is a presumption of unconstitutionality regarding prior restraints).
222
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would question but that a
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”).
223
See 403 U.S. 713.
220
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The national security concerns cited by military officials when
justifying the blogging regulations are very similar to those cited in
United States v. Progressive, Inc.224 There, the government argued
that publication of an article about hydrogen bombs was a threat to
national security because, even though most of the article’s
information was in the public domain, publication of that
information in an easily-accessible format could “help enemies
who otherwise would not put all the pieces together.”225 Similarly,
in regards to milblogs, the military claims that “revealing a minor
aspect of strategy or tactics may seem insignificant . . . but [i]f the
bad guys take a piece from me, and a piece from you, and a piece
from another guy, pretty soon they can gather some pretty good
intel[ligence].”226 The Progressive court ruled in favor of
censorship, noting that publication of the hydrogen bomb article
was “analogous to publication of troop movements or locations in
time of war and falls within the extremely narrow exception to the
rule against prior restraint.”227 If the Department of Defense could
show a valid national security concern stemming from terrorists’
piecemeal assembly of data gleaned from milblogs, this would
arguably be a valid enough national security concern to survive a
strict scrutiny analysis of its milblogging regulations.228
In addition to concerns about information compiled by
terrorists, the military may also be able to show a valid national
security concern by arguing that censorship of milblogs is
necessary to maintain friendly foreign relations in a time of
growing anti-American sentiment. Soldiers’ words may endanger
relations with foreign allies, especially if an individual
servicemember’s words are mistaken for official military policy.229
In the era of a global war on terror “there is . . . a very real danger
that blustering speeches might upset the often delicate relationships
224

467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979); see also supra notes 81–87 and accompanying

text.
225

FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 101; see also supra notes 81–87 and
accompanying text.
226
Mallia, supra note 49 (quoting Marine Capt. Don Caetano).
227
Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 996; see also supra notes 81–87 and accompanying
text.
228
See N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 731–41 (White, J., concurring).
229
Vagts, supra note 158, at 189.
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between [the United States] and our allies and antagonists.”230
This is especially true of speeches made by troops stationed
overseas because “[t]he presence of foreign troops in a country
inevitably grates on local sensitivities.”231 Troops “protesting
policies of [their] own government may incidentally be challenging
those of the host country as well[,]”232 and when servicemen
“inject themselves into the domestic politics, the local citizens’
displeasure can turn into outrage.”233 Moreover, “[f]oreign citizens
unfamiliar with American traditions may resent the protest or
confuse the individual serviceman’s views with those of the United
States.”234 Speech by troops stationed in foreign countries, left
uncensored, could thus create an international conflict or fan the
flames of an already-volatile foreign occupation. Avoiding such a
conflagration may, therefore, be justification enough for the
Department of Defense’s milblogging policies under strict scrutiny
analysis.
i. Maintaining the Military’s Functionality
In addition to concerns about compilation of data by terrorists
and maintenance of foreign relations, in a time of war the military
may also have a compelling interest in restricting speech so that
the hierarchical structure and discipline of the military is
preserved. The military’s pyramidal hierarchy starts with lowlevel “privates, seamen, and airmen bound to respect their
noncommissioned officers” and “culminates in generals and
admirals bound to respect civilian secretaries and the President.”235
Traditionally, “significant military decisions are made by [the]
civilian political leaders, not [lower-level] military personnel.”236
The civilian political leaders thus bear the ultimate responsibility
for military decisions. “Extra restraints on speech in the armed
230

Id.
Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 406.
232
Id. at 409.
233
Id. at 406.
234
Id. at 409; see also Vagts, supra note 158, at 189 (“For many listeners an officer’s
words have a peculiar aura of responsibility and officiality. Many find it hard to believe
the standard disclaimer that a general or admiral is speaking only for himself and ‘not
necessarily’ for the service as a whole.”).
235
Vagts, supra note 158, at 188.
236
Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 406.
231
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services are ultimately rooted in the need for a rigid and
thoroughgoing attitude of subordination”237 towards these leaders,
who “need protection from irresponsible abuse[.]”238 Additionally,
commanders should be able to rely on the “silent support, if not
enthusiasm,” of their subordinates.239 Beyond a need for loyal
troops, there is also a fear that “[a]ny expression of disagreement
[with military policy] by servicemen might move the military into
politics, or prompt a military coup.”240
Milblogs, however, allow dissent to be expressed and
disseminated easily. While it seems unlikely that a milblogger’s
words will prompt a military coup, they could undermine the
discipline of other soldiers. We entrust the military with “a vast
array of weapons systems and technologies, capable of destroying
not only towns and countries, but human civilization as we know
it.”241 Because of these onerous responsibilities, it is crucial to
maintain support and discipline within the armed forces. General
H. Norman Schwarzkopf explained before Congress “that in [his]
forty years of Army service in three different wars, [he is]
convinced that soldier cohesion is the single most important factor
in a unit’s ability to succeed on the battlefield.”242 Moreover,
while serving as Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General
Colin Powell argued that:
We create cohesive teams of warriors who will bond so
tightly that they are prepared to go into battle and give their
lives if necessary for the accomplishment of the mission
and for the cohesion of the group and for their individual
237

Vagts, supra note 158, at 188.
Id.
239
Id.
240
Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 406; see also United States v. Priest, 21
C.M.A. 564, 571 (1972) (noting that one possible harm of the underground newsletter
published by the defendant “is the effect on others if the impression becomes widespread
that revolution, smashing the state, murdering policemen, and assassination of public
officials are acceptable conduct”). But see Sherman, supra note 107, at 344–45 (1971)
(noting that throughout the twentieth century generals have been involved in politics
while still on active duty, and citing the battle between Generals Eisenhower and
MacArthur for the 1952 Republican Presidential nomination as a prominent example of
politicking while still on active duty).
241
John A. Carr, supra note 192, at 345.
242
Id. at 347.
238
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buddies. We cannot allow anything to happen which would
disrupt that feeling of cohesion within the force.243
Certain types of free speech “may subtly undermine the
loyalty, discipline, and morale of servicemen.”244 Moreover,
“[f]irst amendment activity questioning military and national
policies may lead to violence and a loss of disciplinary control”
because “[s]ervicemen trained in physical response are often eager
to relieve tensions and are frequently intolerant of ‘different’
viewpoints.”245 The Department of Defense may thus be able to
show it has a compelling interest in maintaining soldiers’
discipline, and their respect for superior officers. In addition to
national security concerns, these arguments may also be enough to
allow the milblogging regulations to survive strict scrutiny.
b) Strict Scrutiny is Needed to Protect against Viewpoint
Discrimination
The justifications for the Department of Defense’s milblogging
policy certainly seem compelling: the need to guard against
terrorists’ compilation of information dangerous to America, and
the need to maintain the military’s functionality. Arguably then, a
content-neutral milblogging policy would withstand strict scrutiny.
However, while the Department of Defense’s milblogging policy is
content-neutral on its face, there is evidence that it is being used as
a pretext for viewpoint discrimination.246 The question thus
remains as to whether the DOD’s compelling interests are enough
justify viewpoint discrimination.247
243

Id. at 347 n.283.
Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 405.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fifty-Fifth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: The First
Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 199, 213 (1994).
[E]ven viewpoint restrictions will be allowed if there is a sufficiently
compelling government interest. For example, a school system likely would
have a compelling interest in choosing not to spend scarce library dollars for
racist propaganda. There, of course, is no formula for deciding what is a
compelling interest; but that is a problem throughout constitutional law . . . .
Id.
244
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Under the current Department of Defense policy, unit
commanders in Iraq are given the burden of ensuring milbloggers’
compliance with regulations.248
This means that “many
commanders may abuse [their authority to balance First
Amendment expression values] and continue to overreact to
servicemen’s expression of unpopular views.”249
There is
evidence of this type of viewpoint discrimination occurring in Iraq,
where authors of blogs critical of the war are censored while proIraq blogs remain untouched. For example, Leonard Clark’s blog
contained descriptions of his company’s captain as a “glory
seeker,” characterized his battalion sergeant as an “inhuman
monster,” and suggested that “his fellow soldiers were becoming
opposed to the U.S. mission in Iraq.”250 Clark’s punishment,
discussed above, constituted “every possible punishment”
available for violating OpSec in his politically-liberal blog.251
Jason Hartley’s blog was also written in a notoriously sarcastic and
critical style.252 In his blog, Hartley wrote accounts of the frat-boy
like antics of his fellow soldiers, described his unit’s missions in a
sarcastic manner, and characterized his time in Iraq as “a constant
state of suck.”253 While the Army contends that these postings
violated OpSec,254 Hartley feels that “the Army’s real concern was
his satiric tone.”255 Hartley contends that “[the blogs] that stay up
are completely patriotic and innocuous, and they’re fine if you
want to read the flag-waving and how everything’s peachy keen in
Iraq[.]”256 At least one commentator agrees with this assertion that
military officials are trying to muffle dissent from troops in the

248

See Vines’ Memorandum, supra note 27.
Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 409.
250
Finer, supra note 13 (quoting an entry where Clark wrote that “[a] growing number
of men [stationed in Iraq] are starting to wonder why we should continue to risk our lives
for this whole mess when we know that the government will probably pull out of here”).
251
Thomas Claburn, Army Chief of Staff Calls For More Oversight of Military
Bloggers, INFO. WEEK, Sept. 1, 2005, available at http://informationweek.com/story/
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=170102708.
252
John Hockenberry, supra note 11.
253
Id.
254
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
255
Mallia, supra note 49.
256
Id.
249
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field.257 Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution in Washington, has commented that censorship of
milblogs “has much less to do with operational security and
classified secrets and more to do with American politics and how
the war is seen by a public that is getting increasingly shaky about
the overall venture[.]”258 This assertion is also supported by
memoranda from top military officials cautioning against posting
information that would negatively affect the public’s perception of
the war.259
This evidence of viewpoint discrimination is problematic
because while the Department of Defense may have legitimate
security concerns, those concerns do not justify their political
control of information about the Iraq war. If Hartley and Clark’s
blogs did contain information that could be used by the enemy,
then their punishments are justified. However, if Hartley’s
assertion is correct that the military shut down his blog because he
portrayed the war in a negative light, then this is something that
must be dealt with by the courts. Under Glines,260 soldiers like
Hartley who claim viewpoint discrimination still have a cause of
action for violation of their First Amendment rights. These
soldiers can assert that commanders applied the Department of
Defense’s milblogging regulation “irrationally, invidiously, or
arbitrarily.”261 However, the Supreme Court should also use strict
scrutiny to conduct a substantive review of the military’s decision
to censor milbloggers, to ensure that the underlying security
concerns cited by the government are legitimate, and not merely a
pretext for the Department of Defense to gain public relations
control of the Iraq war. In this way, the Court can ensure that
national security is maintained while the rights guaranteed to
servicemen by the Constitution are also preserved.262
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IV. CONCLUSION
Milblogs have created new operational security risks for the
military, and as the Department of Defense struggles to deal with
these risks, it is up to the courts to police their actions to ensure
servicemembers’ First Amendment rights are being protected.
Milblogs serve important societal interests: they are both a
therapeutic tool that let soldiers write about the trauma of combat
and a democratic tool that let Americans thousands of miles away
have a bird’s-eye, hopefully uncensored, view of the Iraq War.
Milbloggers are thus contributing to the political dialogue by
allowing anyone with an Internet connection to read about their
experiences in Iraq. Because anyone can access milblogs, the
Court’s deference to the military as a separate community is
inapplicable here. Instead, the Court should view the Department
of Defense’s milblogging regulation as a prior restraint or,
alternatively, view it through the lens of strict scrutiny. Either of
these standards of review will allow true national security concerns
to pass constitutional muster while invalidating any pretextual
viewpoint discrimination. Given the military’s attempts to gain
public relations control of the Iraq War, strict scrutiny is necessary
to ensure that servicemembers are not unjustly being denied the
very rights they are fighting to protect. To answer Former Chief
Justice Warren’s question,263 it is possible to preserve the Nation
and the Constitution at the same time, and in the milblogging
context it is up to the Court to strike this balance.
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